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	 Abstract			 	 	Between	a	Bear	and	an	Eagle:	Soviet	Arms	and	the	U.S.	Response	in	Peru					This	research	looks	at	the	left-leaning	military	government	of	Juan	Velasco	Alvarado	of	Peru	ruled	from	1968	to	1975.	This	government	embarked	on	a	crusade	to	modernize	Peru	through	a	series	of	reforms	and	changes	in	Peruvian	foreign	policy.	The	United	States	responded	with	non-overt	economic	pressure,	and	the	ending	of	military	sales	to	Peru.	Peru	bought	weaponry	from	the	Soviet	Union	against	the	wishes	of	the	United	States	in	1973,	and	this	resulted	in	a	more	conciliatory	foreign	policy	from	the	United	States	towards	the	Andean	nation.	The	shifting	foreign	policy	is	the	opposite	of	how	historians	have	characterized	relations	between	the	United	States	and	Latin	America.			My	research	contributes	to	the	historiography	of	United	States-Peruvian	Relations	by	expanding	on	very	limited	coverage	of	the	Velasco	period.	This	is	examined	through	a	regional,	high	level	diplomatic,	and	economic	lens.	This	thesis	argues	that	the	United	States	is	willing	to	work	with	left	leaning	Latin	American	governments	if	expropriated	companies	are	properly	compensated.			This	period	in	American-Peruvian	history	is	incredibly	important	to	explaining	the	motivations	and	goals	in	U.S.	foreign	policy.	The	examination	of	Soviet	Arms	in	Peru,	and	Peru’s	work	in	the	early	Drug	War	is	a	new	addition	to	the	historiography	of	this	subject.									
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8		 	regional	aspect,	but	it	does	not	highlight	the	role	of	Latin	Americans	enough.		This	work	is	adding	to	a	trend	in	the	historiography	that	highlights	Latin	American	agency	in	the	shaping	of	U.S.	foreign	policy.	Hal	Brands’	Latin	America’s	Cold	War	and	James	Siekmeier’s	Bolivian	Revolution	and	the	United	States	place	a	far	greater	importance	on	the	actions	of	elite	and	non-elite	Latin	Americans	in	the	shaping	of	Cold	War	politics	in	the	Western	Hemisphere	than	previous	authors.	Alan	McPherson’s	The	Invaded	examines	Latin	American	responses	to	U.S.	military	invasions	in	the	early	1900s	to	explain	the	eventual	end	of	this	form	of	imperialism.	These	works	have	contributed	to	the	trend	of	adding	the	importance	of	work	done	by	Latin	Americans	to	the	historiography	of	U.S.	foreign	relations.		The	diplomatic	finesse	by	the	Peruvian	government	during	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	directly	contributed	to	U.S.	accommodation	to	the	regime.	Any	examination	into	U.S.	foreign	policy	is	insufficient	without	studying	the	actions	and	intentions	of	the	foreign	power.			 	Thesis	Organization		 The	first	chapter	focuses	on	the	military	and	political	connections	between	Peru	and	the	United	States	prior	to	the	Peruvian	Revolution	in	1968.	This	includes	the	political	clashes	that	helped	create	the	revolution	such	as	U.S.	support	for	a	political	group	hated	by	the	Peruvian	military,	refusals	by	the	United	States	to	supply	napalm	to	the	Peruvian	army,	and	the	conflict	over	an	infamous	oil	company.	The	second	chapter	details	what	the	Peruvian	Revolution	attempted	to	accomplish	and	how	these	activities	promoted	independence	from	the	United	States.	The	chapter	also	focuses	on	the	direct	line	of	events	
9		 	from	Chile’s	devastating	1970	earthquake	to	its	election	of	Allende	as	president	-	all	occurring	the	same	year	Peru	began	purchasing	Soviet	arms.	The	final	chapter	expounds	upon	the	work	of	the	previous	chapter,	but	spotlights	the	direct	cause	and	effect	of	the	Soviet	arms	deal	on	U.S.	foreign	policy.					 		 			 	 	 							 																	































29		 	Peru	and	the	United	States	maintained	an	unusually	beneficial	relationship	from	the	beginning	of	nationhood.	Peru	happily	accepted	military	support	after	each	of	the	great	global	conflicts	during	the	20th	century.	The	Cold	War	brought	the	a	sizable	number	of	US	sponsored	coups	to	depose	or	attempt	to	depose	left	leaning	governments,	such	as	in	Guatemala,	Cuba,	Dominican	Republic,	and	Chile,	but	Peru	managed	to	avoid	the	worst	effects	of	anti-communism	from	its	powerful	northern	ally.	However,	political	differences	beginning	in	the	1960s	came	to	a	head	with	the	1968	Peruvian	Revolution.	The	accompanying	accommodation	by	the	United	States	was	due	in	great	part	to	the	traditional	military	connection,	and	the	deep	respect	and	trust	that	the	United	States	felt	towards	the	Peruvian	military.	Velasco’s	“Revolution	from	above”	would	test	the	relationship	in	a	way	never	seen	between	the	two	nations.				 		 	 	 		 	 																			
30		 	Chapter	3	The	Institutional	Revolution	in	Peru	1968-1972	and	the	U.S.	Response			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 		 Introduction	October	3rd	1968’s	great	event	began	with	a	flurry	of	telephone	calls,	and	ended	with	the	exile	of	the	Peruvian	president,	Belaúnde,	to	Argentina.	Juan	Velasco’s	rise	to	power	officially	began	the	Peruvian	Revolution	(1968-1975).	The	Peruvian	Revolution	caught	the	Central	Intelligence	Agency,	President	Belaúnde,	and	the	world	off	guard.	The	Peruvian	government’s	actions	over	the	next	few	years	continued	to	surprise	the	United	States.	Velasco	unleashed	revolutionary	changes	in	Peru.	Five	main	events	marked	Peru’s	turn	towards	a	more	independent	foreign	policy	that	eventually	included	the	purchase	of	large	quantities	of	Soviet	weaponry.	First,	The	Plan	Inca	agrarian	reform	in	June	1969	ushered	in	a	period	of	expropriation,	and	challenges	to	the	Peruvian	oligarchy.	Second,	the	formation	of	the	Andean	Pact	in	May	of	the	same	year	threatened	to	construct	a	regional	alliance	that	could	destroy	the	traditional	hegemony	of	the	United	States	in	Latin	America.	Third	was	a	devastating	earthquake	in	May	1970	that	impacted	both	the	United	States’	relationship	with	Peru	as	well	as	the	development	of	the	Soviet-Peruvian	relations.	Fourth	in	1972,	the	consistent	seizure	of	US	tuna	boats	sparked	reaction	by	infuriated	congressmen	and	businessmen	into	action	largely,	but	Peru’s	cooperation	in	the	drug	war	brought	a	sizable	cooling	to	the	U.S.-Peruvian	relationship.	In	addition	to	the	land	reform	and	tuna-boat	controversy,	Peru	nationalized	industries	owned	by	U.S.	companies.	The	fifth	event	occurred	in	Chile	rather	than	Peru	and	was	one	of	most	important	events	in	Latin	America	during	the	1970s.	Socialist	Salvador	Allende	was	elected	president	in	September	
31		 	1970	leading	President	Nixon	and	National	Security	Advisor	Henry	Kissinger	to	begin	to	accept,	with	some	reluctance,	that	Latin	America	had	emerged	as	one	of	the	most	important	areas	in	global	politics	to	the	jubilation	of	some,	and	the	horror	of	many.	These	events	highlight	both	the	attempts	of	Peru	to	change	its	position	in	the	region,	the	concurrent	problems	that	made	the	U.S.-Peruvian	relationship	difficult	to	manage,	and	the	earthquake	that	cooled	the	relationship	but	brought	the	Soviet	Union	into	Peru.		The	United	States	needed	to	retain	Peru	as	an	ally	to	combat	communism	in	South	America	and	to	retain	access	to	Peru’s	natural	resources.	Peru	wanted	to	become	more	independent	economically	from	the	United	States,	and	embark	on	a	mission	of	modernization.	These	two	visions	ran	headlong	into	one	another	with	both	nations	feeling	that	they	not	accommodate	one	another’s	demands	or	cut	ties.						 	 	 From	Belaúnde	to	Velasco	The	deterioration	of	U.S.	–Peruvian	relations	in	the	1960s	is	due	to	a	few	important	moments.	The	ever-continuous	controversy	over	U.S.	tuna	fisherman	fishing	in	Peruvian	waters	stirred	deep	feelings	of	nationalism	among	the	Peruvian	people	against	the	United	States.	The	guerilla	uprising	in	1965,	and	the	U.S.	army’s	refusal	to	supply	napalm	to	Peru	greatly	damaged	its	relationship	with	the	Peruvian	army.	Finally,	the	US	refusal	to	sell	supersonic	jets	to	Peru	showed	many	in	Peru	that	dependence	on	the	United	States	would	need	to	be	gradually	curtailed.	Despite	these	ruptures,	the	United	States	would	continue	to	try	to	mend	the	relationship.	Why	would	Peru	get	this	special	treatment	and	other	left	leaning	nations	in	Latin	America	would	not?			
32		 	Despite	Peru’s	anti-U.S.	and	anti-free	market	policies,	US-Peruvian	relations	remained	relatively	cordial	in	the	Velasco	era.	The	strain	would	be	great,	but	both	nations	worked	desperately	to	keep	events	from	moving	too	far	from	the	pre-1960s	amiability.	Traditionally,	the	two	bedrock	policies	of	the	United	States	towards	Latin	America	were	that	the	governments	in	the	region	needed	to	promote	a	friendly	business	climate	for	foreign	private-sector	capital;	and	secondly	Latin	American	governments	needed	to	keep	Soviet	influence	out.	Left-of-center	nations	such	as	Chile	and	Guatemala	received	a	cold	shoulder	when	attempting	to	change	their	societies,	but	Velasco	benefited	from	the	fact	that	the	U.S.	allowed	greater	flexibility	for	Peru’s	relationship	with	the	Soviet	Union.		The	result	of	Peru	purchasing	Soviet	arms	was	that	the	United	States	realized	that	accommodation	was	the	only	coherent	option	for	the	Latin	American	nation.	The	answer	for	this	outcome	is	a	combination	of	historical	ties,	exceptional	diplomacy	on	the	part	of	the	Peruvians,	the	firm	non-Marxism	of	the	Peruvian	Revolution,	minimal	ties	to	Cuba	and	the	USSR,	and	compensation	for	expropriated	U.S.	companies.	The	lack	of	another	feasible	option,	such	as	finding	dissident	generals	to	stage	a	coup,	also	played	a	pivotal	role.				 Velasco:	background		 	Juan	Velasco	Alvarado	grew	up	in	relative	poverty	in	northern	Peru	but	joined	the	army	when	he	was	19	to	escape	his	former	life.55	He	was	accepted	to	the	Chorillos	Military	School,	which	was	modeled	on	American	military	academies	and	gained	attention	for	his	performance	and	personal	charisma.	In	1965,	Velasco	became	chief	of	staff	of	the	army,	and	discovered	the	intransigence	of	the	Peruvian	congress	to	change	and	its	slowness	in																																																									55	Abraham	Lowenthal	and	Cynthia	McClintock,	The	Peruvian	Experiment	Reconsidered	(Guildford:	Princeton	University	Press,	1983),	215.		
33		 	fighting	leftist	guerillas.	The	general	despised	the	International	Petroleum	Company’s	control	over	so	much	of	the	nation’s	resources.	Ultimately,	the	company’s	refusal	to	honor	the	Act	of	Talara,	the	act	that	would	require	of	I.P.C.	to	turn	over	the	La	Brea	oilfields	to	Peru	in	exchange	for	concessions,	proved	to	be	too	much	for	Velasco,	and	the	generals	and	colonels	around	him.		Velasco’s	greatest	influence	came	from	neither	the	United	States	nor	the	Latin	American	leftist	tradition.	The	mid-nineteenth	century	Peruvian	president	Ramón	Castilla	created	the	template	for	the	Peruvian	Revolution.56	Castilla’s	military	rule	was	marked	by	modernization	of	the	armed	forces,	laws,	and	a	respect	for	constitutions.	This	president	wielded	power	through	a	series	of	decrees,	which	included	the	abolition	of	slavery.	Castilla’s	core	beliefs	stemmed	from	Peruvian	nationalism,	and	he	initiated	a	defense	treaty	with	Chile	and	Bolivia	to	protect	South	America	from	an	aggressive	Spain.	Velasco	remained	a	committed	nationalist	and	anti-communist	all	of	his	life,	and	defined	his	beliefs	and	goals	to	his	friend	Meza	Cuadra,	“Power	spreads	its	tentacles	from	above.	Everywhere	the	rich	pull	the	strings.	The	big	companies	call	the	shots.”	He	continued,	“We	need	to	press	for	reform	in	Peru,	to	regain	its	sovereignty,	especially	in	relation	to	the	United	States.”57	The	other	important	influencer	on	Velasco	was	Marxist	philosopher	José	Mariátegui’s	seminal	work	Seven	Interpretive	Essays	on	Peruvian	Reality,	which	expressed	the	view	that	drawing	on	the	Incan	past	could	reform	Peruvian	society.				
																																																								

































53		 	stating	that	a	severe	response	from	Peru	would	inevitability	occur	if	the	U.S.	continued	or	increased	pressure.	Conciliatory	action	was		clearly	seen	as	being	more	beneficial	as	a	diplomatic	strategy.	Peru	successfully	managed	to	play	the	United	States	and	the	Soviet	Union	off	one	another,	while	attempting	revolutionary	change.	Peru’s	success	in	this	manner	cannot	be	understated	especially	as	the	nation	was	one	of	the	poorest	in	the	region	and	possibly	the	closest	of	Latin	American	nations	towards	the	United	States	before	1968.			 Drugs,	the	Peruvian	Revolution,	and	the	United	States		  One	aspect	that	is	neglected	in	the	traditional	narratives	on	the	U.S.-Peruvian	relationship	during	the	revolutionary	period	is	the	subject	of	illicit	drugs.	Cocaine	is	produced	from	the	coca	plants	grown	in	the	Andes,	and	the	growth	of	the	cocaine	industry	worried	both	the	United	States	and	the	Peruvian	governments.	Significantly,	Peru	led	all	of	Latin	America	in	drug	arrests	and	seizures	in	the	early	1970s.112	In	1971,	The	Bureau	of	Narcotics	and	Dangerous	Drugs,	later	to	become	the	Drug	Enforcement	Agency,	began	to	work	with	Peruvian	Law	enforcement	at	the	request	of	Peruvian	officials.	The	Velasco	regime	feared	the	social	ills	that	the	increased	drug	trade	would	cause,	and	the	government	corruption	that	might	accompany	the	growth	of	this	illicit	market.	The	Peruvian	Investigations	Police,	PIP,	wanted	help	filming	coca	plantations,	and	the	Bureau	of	Narcotics	and	Dangerous	Drugs,	BNDD,	began	its	attempt	to	set	up	a	permanent	office	in	
																																																								112	“Comments	of	Foreign	Service	Inspectors	on	BNDD	Activities	in	Peru,”	U.S.	Department	of	State,	July	31,	1973,	General	Records	of	the	Department	of	State,	Bureau	of	International	
Narcotics	Matters	(1970-1978),	Records	Group	59,	United	States	National	Archives,	Box	11,	1-2.		




55		 	drugs	with	from	$19,000	in	1973	to	a	proposed	increase	of	$400,000	the	next	year.116	The	State	Department	was	clearly	supporting	Peru’s	rise	as	a	regional	leader	in	the	fight	against	cocaine	production.	It	is	hard	to	imagine	that	the	great	deal	of	cooperation	between	Peru	and	the	United	States	in	support	of	the	Drug	War	did	not	affect	the	decision	to	tolerate	the	revolutionary	government,	but	future	scholarship	will	have	to	prove	the	connection.			 The	1970s	changed	the	United	States’	ranking	of	Latin	American	in	terms	of	importance	on	the	world	stage.117	Allende	became	Latin	America’s	first	democratically	elected	Marxist	president	in	1970,	and	forced	the	Nixon	administration	to	really	start	paying	attention	to	South	America.	Velasco’s	Peru	played	a	strategic	game	of	courting	the	United	States	one	day,	and	antagonizing	it	the	next.	Appealing	to	nationalism	allowed	Peru	to	confiscate	tuna	boats,	enact	agrarian	reform,	and	begin	an	Andean	movement	to	promote	economic	independence.	Despite	enacting	policies	to	move	away	from	the	traditional	goals	of	U.S.	foreign	policy,	Peru	understood	that	its	relationship	with	the	United	States	needed	to	continue	in	order	for	Peru	to	remain	economically	stable	for	the	short-term	future.					 																																																														116	“Updated	Narcotics	Control	Action	Plan	for	Peru”	September	17,	1973.	General	Records	
of	the	Department	of	State,	Bureau	of	International	Narcotics	Matters	(1970-1978),	Records	Group	59,	United	States	National	Archives,	Box	11,	5.			117	Peru,	Bolivia,	and	Ecuador	all	adopted	left	leaning	policies	to	challenge	the	regional	supremacy	of	the	United	States.	The	Nixon	administration	had	to	contend	with	an	American	public	that	was	both	fervently	anti-communist	and	tired	of	foreign	involvements	after	many	years	in	Vietnam.		
56		 		 Chapter	4		 The	first	Soviet	Military	Sales	in	South	America:	Peruvian	Agency	in	US-Peruvian	Relations			 Introduction	The	Peruvian	Revolution	suffered	setbacks	in	the	first	five	years	of	its	existence,	but	the	majority	of	U.S.	officials	believed	that	the	military	government	was	firmly	in	power.	Peru	continued	to	press	the	United	States	for	weaponry,	but	conflicts	over	tuna	rights	kept	the	United	States	from	granting	the	Peruvian	request.	The	Soviet	Union	happily	filled	the	void,	and	brokered	an	arms	deal	with	Peru	in	the	summer	of	1973.	Instead	of	acting	harshly,	the	United	States	changed	policy	toward	Peru	to	be	more	conciliatory.	An	important	factor	in	the	long	life	of	Velasco’s	regime	was	the	lack	of	dissident	generals	for	the	United	States	to	support.	The	years	of	turbulence	between	Peru	and	the	United	States	ended	after	the	Soviet	arms	deal	for	the	simple	fact	that	the	United	States	needed	an	ally	in	the	region,	and	the	North	American	nation	realized	that	continuing	hostile	policies	could	only	drive	Peru	closer	to	its	mortal	enemy.	The	United	States	interests	from	1973	to	1975	largely	continued	to	be	the	same	as	they	had	since	the	Peruvian	Revolution.	The	exception	was	the	desire	to	prevent	conflict	between	Peru	and	Chile	and	to	keep	Soviet	influence	in	Peru	to	a	minimum.	The	military	government	of	Peru’s	interests	during	this	time	period	were	to	maintain	power,	obtain	more	advanced	weaponry,	and	become	a	more	important	player	in	the	Third	World.		In	1973,	even	as	US-Peruvian	relations	were	strained,	these	relations	seemed	poised	to	get	worse.	Cuba’s	demonstration	of	Soviet	Arms	to	the	Peruvian	Military	during	a	















67		 	Banzer	took	power	in	Bolivia	in	1970s,	it	too	proved	a	stable,	pro-U.S.	force	in	the	region.		With	many,	pro-U.S.	military	governments	in	South	America,	Washington	could	stomach	Peru	buying	Soviet	weapons.				 U.S.	Softens	its	Policy	towards	Peru	because	of	Peruvian	Actions		 In	September	1973,	the	United	States	decided	to	end	its	punitive	sanctions	against	Peru.	Peruvians	and	U.S.	businesses	complained	to	the	New	York	Times	that	the	economic	sanctions	failed	to	have	their	desired	effect,	and	Peru	continued	to	attract	investment	from	U.S.	oil	companies.149	The	previous	pressures	from	the	United	States	lifted	constituted	a	number	of	different	techniques.	The	ban	on	arms	sales,	pressure	from	international	lending	agencies	and	New	York	banks	against	lending	to	Peru,	and	the	pressure	on	major	industrial	nations	with	ties	in	Peru	to	reduce	their	economic	relations	with	Peru	all	ended.150	U.S.	officials	apparently	agreed.	Secretary	of	Defense	Elliot	Richardson	sent	a	secret	memo	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	William	P.	Rogers,	arguing	that	the	United	States	should	resume	arms	sales	to	Peru	to	prevent	the	Soviet	Union	from	becoming	too	influential.151	The	threat	of	Soviet	influence	through	arms	sales	along	with	the	failure	of	punitive	sanctions	forced	the	United	States	to	make	a	major	u-turn	in	how	it	dealt	with	the	military	government	of	Peru.	The	State	Department	considered	a	few	alternatives,	but	any	response	that	provoked	an	angry	Peruvian	backlash	would	be	a	problem.	U.S.	leaders	wanted	to	maintain	access	to																																																									149	New	York	Times	(April	18,	1973),	8:1.			150	President’s	Assistant	for	National	Security	Affairs,	Kissinger,	to	President	Nixon,	“Status	Report	Economic	Pressures	on	Peru”,	April	17,	1969,	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States,	1969-1976,	Volume	E-10,	Documents	on	American	Republics,	1969-1972.	eds.	Douglas	Kraft	and	James	Siekmeier	(Washington:	Government	Printing	Office,	2009),	Document	595.	https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d595	151	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	270.		
68		 	Peruvian	natural	resources.152		The	Soviet	arms	sales	had	forced	the	United	States	to	change	its	foreign	policy	to	be	more	conciliatory	to	Peru	to	keep	the	Latin	American	nation	from	moving	closer	to	the	Soviet	Union.		However	despite	Nixon’s	earlier	disinterest	towards	Latin	America,	the	president	admitted	that	he	wanted	to	save	Latin	America	from	communist	forces.	Peru	remained	separate	from	Chile	in	American	foreign	policy	due	to	its	non-Marxist	identification,	and	willingness	to	accept	foreign	private-sector	investment.153	A	pragmatic	approach	from	the	State	Department	and	White	House	led	the	United	States	to	accept	leftist	governments	in	Bolivia,	Peru,	and	Ecuador,	but	still	work	against	nations	moving	away	from	capitalism.	Compensation	for	expropriation	greatly	helped	to	save	Peru	from	the	same	fate	as	Chile.	The	military	government	claimed	that	the	International	Petroleum	Company	(IPC),	the	first	target	of	expropriation,	owed	Peru	almost	$700	million	dollars	in	back	taxes	that	needed	to	be	paid	in	February	1969.154	The	United	States	grew	increasingly	wary	as	Peru	chose	to	expropriate	Casa	Grace,	the	decades	old	shipping,	paper,	and	sugar	conglomerate,	in	August	the	same	year.155	Foreign	minister	Mercado	deftly	claimed	the	following	month	in	an	address	to	the	United	Nations	General	Assembly	that	Peru	only	expropriated	companies	that	had	contentious	histories	of	inequality	with	the	nation.	A	joint	agreement	between	the	military	government	and	the	Sheraton	Hotel	Company	to	build	a	modern	complex	in	Lima	greatly	helped	to	validate	the	foreign	minister’s	claim.	The	Velasco	regime	understood	that	survival	depended	on	keeping	the	United	States	close	enough	with	Peruvian	affairs	to	placate	the	United	States,	but	far	enough	that	the	Peruvian	public	would	not	believe	that																																																									152	“Peruvian	Purchase	of	Soviet	Arms:	U.S.	Policy	Response.”	Wikileaks	June	30,	2005.		153	Tanya	Harmer,	Allende’s	Chile	and	the	Inter-American	Cold	War,	152.		154	Lawrence	Clayton,	Peru	and	the	United	States:	The	Eagle	and	the	Condor.	240.		155	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	209.		
69		 	the	government	did	not	really	believe	in	putting	the	nation’s	interests	first.	Unfortunately	for	the	military	government,	secret	talks	over	compensating	the	International	Petroleum	Company	became	public	knowledge	in	1972	to	great	the	embarrassment	to	Velasco.156	In	1974,	the	negotiations	for	Peruvian	compensation	for	IPC	concluded	when	the	governments	of	Peru	and	the	United	States	Special	Presidential	Representative	James	Greene	negotiated	the	Greene	Settlement.157		The	International	Petroleum	Company,	Casa	Grace,	and	other	U.S.	companies	nationalized	by	Peru	received	$76	million	dollars	in	compensation	paid	by	Peru,	but	distributed	by	the	United	States.158	Robert	Dean,	Belcher’s	replacement	for	ambassador	to	Peru,	summed	up	perfectly	the	strategy	to	keep	Peru	in	the	U.S.	fold	as	well	as	the	reasons	for	why	the	United	States	remained	so	flexible	towards	the	Latin	American	nation	in	the	telegram	to	the	Secretary	of	State.		“U.S.	Security	Assistance	to	Peru	helps	to	dispose	this	militarily	ruled	country	more	favorably	to	our	overall	interests,	notably	access	to	natural	resources,	and	it	reduces	what	is	obtained	from	communist	sources.	In	terms	of	the	effectiveness	of	such	assistance	it	has	helped	to	keep	Peru	in	the	inter-American	defense	system	and	has	molded	favorably	the	attitude	of	many	of	the	current	and	also	future	officers	who	rule	and	will	probably	continue	ruling	Peru.”159			Peru’s	purchase	of	Soviet	arms	did	not	end	with	tanks	in	December	of	1973.	A	failure	to	reach	an	agreement	on	aircraft	purchases	with	the	United	States	led	to	the	USSR’s	first	military	arms	sale	to	any	Latin	American	nation	in	the	May	of	1975.160	Thirty	Soviet-Made																																																									156	Hal	Brands,	“The	United	States	and	the	Peruvian	Challenge,	1960-1975,”	481.		157	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States,	1969-1976,	Documents	on	South	America,	1973-1976.	Sara	Berndt,	Halbert	Jones,	and	James	Siekmeier	eds	1,		(Washington:	Government	Printing	Office,	2014),	Document	296.		158	“Peru”	National	Intelligence	Bulletin.	December	21	1974,	CIA-RDP79T00975A02730010008-0	159	“Security	Assistance	Objectives	and	Guidelines	for	Peru”	June	21st	1974,	Wikileaks,	June	30th	2005.	https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974LIMA05010_b.html	160	“Peru	Buys	First	Soviet	Military	Aircraft”	May	6	1975,	CIA-RDP79T01098A000500060002-4	










1978),	Records	Group	59,	United	States	National	Archives,	Box	11.			 	 	 Secondary	Sources	Andrea,	Carol.	Carol	Andrea.	When	Women	Rebel:	The	Rise	of	Popular	Feminism	in		
Peru.	Westport:	L.	Hill	Publishing,	1985.	Brands,	Hal.	Latin	America’s	Cold	War.	Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2010.	Hal	Brands,	“The	United	States	and	the	Peruvian	Challenge,	1968-1975”	Diplomacy	&		
Statecraft	21,	2010.	
74		 	Carey,	James.	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1900-1962.	Notre	Dame:	University	of		Notre	Dame	Press,	1964.		Christenson,	Joel.	“From	Gunboats	to	Good	Neighbors:	U.S.	Naval	Diplomacy	in	Peru,		1919-1942.”	(Ann	Arbor,	Proquest	Publishing,	2013),	Clarke,	Nathan.	“Revolutionizing	the	Tragic	City:	Rebuilding	Chimbote,	Peru,	after		the	1970	Earthquake”	Journal	of	Urban	History,	Vol	4,	93-115	2015.	Clayton,	Lawrence.	Peru	and	the	United	States:	The	Condor	and	the	Eagle.	Athens:		University	of	Georgia	Press,	1999	Cotler,	Julio.	The	Cambridge	History	of	Latin	America.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University		Press,	2008.		Flindell	Klarén,	Peter.	Peru:	Society	and	Nationhood	in	the	Andes.	Cambridge:		Harvard	University	Press,	2000.		Fontaine,	Roger.	The	Andean	Pact:	A	Political	Analysis.	Washington	D.C.:	Sage		Publications,	1977.	Heilman,	Jaymie.	Before	the	Shining	Path:	Politics	in	Rural	Ayacucho,	1895-1980.		Palo	Alto:	Stanford	University	Press,	2010	Kofas,	Jon	V.	Foreign	Debt	and	Underdevelopment:	U.S.-Peruvian	Economic	Relations.		Lanham:	University	Press	of	America,	1996.		Kornbluh,	Peter.	The	Pinochet	File:	A	Declassified	Dossier	on	Atrocity	and	Accountability.		New	York:	The	New	Press,	2013.	Kruijit,	Dirk.	Revolution	by	Decree:	Peru	1968-1975.	West	Lafayette:	Purdue		University	Press,	2003.	McClintock,	Cynthia	and	Abraham	F.	Lowenthal.	The	Peruvian	Experiment		
75		 	
Reconsidered.	Guildford:	Princeton	University	Press,	1983.		McClintock,	Cynthia	and	Fabian	Vallas.	The	United	States	and	Peru:	Cooperation	at	a	Cost	
	New	York:	Routledge	Press,	2003.	McClintock	Cynthia.		Peasant	Cooperatives	and	Political	Change	in	Peru	Princeton:	Princeton		University	Press,	1981.			Pineo,	Ronn.	Ecuador	and	the	United	States:	Useful	Strangers.	Athens:	University	of		Georgia	Press,	2007.		Pike,	Frederick.	The	United	States	and	the	Andean	Republics:	Peru,	Bolivia,	and	Ecuador.		Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1977.		Prizel,	Ilya.	Latin	American	Through	Soviet	Eyes:	The	Evolution	of	Soviet	Perceptions.		Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1990.	Rabe,	Stephen.	The	Most	Dangerous	Area	in	the	World:	John	F.	Kennedy	Confronts		
Communism	in	Latin	America.	Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,		1999.	Shaleth,	Maria	R.	“Land	Reform	Under	Military:	Agrarian	Reform	in	Peru,	1969-78.”		
Economic	and	Political	Weekly,	Vol.	26,	No.	30	July	27,	1991.	Sharp,	Daniel.	U.S.	Foreign	Policy	and	Peru.	Austin:	University	of	Texas	Press,	1972.	Siekmeier,	James.	The	Bolivian	Revolution	and	the	United	States,	1952	to	the	Present.		University	Park:	Pennsylvania	State	University	Press,	2011	Starn,	Orin.	The	Peru	Reader.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2005.	Tsurumi,	Rebecca.	The	Closed	Hand:	Images	of	the	Japanese	in	Modern	Peruvian		
Literature.	West	Lafayette:	Purdue	University	Press,	2010.	Walker,	Thomas	W.	and	Christine	J.	Wade.	Nicaragua:	Living	in	the	Shadow	of	the		
76		 	
Eagle.	Boulder,	Westview	Press,	2011.	Walter,	Richard.	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-1975:	How	their	Ambassadors	
	Managed	Foreign	Relations	in	a	Turbulent	Era.	University	Park:	Pennsylvania		State	University,	2010.	Yglesias,	Jose.”Report	from	Peru:	The	Reformers	in	Brass	Hats:	The	reformers	in		brass	hats”	New	York	Times,	(1923-Current	files);	Dec	14,	1969.			 		
